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Abstract 
We based our research on the assumption that an efficient implementation of corporate governance requirements allows 
prudent supervision of Romanian investment firms by the Financial Supervision Authority. Moreover, some significant 
weaknesses in corporate governance has facilitated the emergence of extremely delicate circumstances in which some 
Romanian investment firms lost their brokerage licenses as a result of fraudulent operations that favoured 
misappropriation of client assets. Improving the effectiveness of governance structures would help to prevent the 
occurrence of similar future events, restoring investor confidence in the Romanian capital market mechanisms and 
institutions. The main focus of our research is to assess the compliance level with relevant corporate governance 
requirements applied to Romanian investment firms.             
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1. Literature Review and Problem Formulation 
Corporate governance plays a crucial role in improving the efficiency of the capital market through its 
impact on corporate operating efficiency and effectiveness, and the integrity and quality of financial reports 
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(Rezaee, 2004). According to Calder, 2008 the “greed is good” business philosophy of the 1980s and 1990s 
seemed to give way at the end of the 20th century to a “looting is good” approach. Unfortunately, this reality is 
verified even on the Romanian capital market, taking into consideration the major scandals that shook 
investors’ confidence in the Romanian investment firms over the period 2012-2013 (see the cases of WBS 
Romania and Harinvest). This decline in trust and its implications for financial institutions represent one 
major driving force behind corporate governance reform (Solomon and Solomon, 2004). One positive 
response may come from the institutional investors who may strengthen corporate governance by acting more 
activist in their approach to their investee companies and more proactive in intervening in underperforming 
companies (Mallin, 2006). Nevertheless, Romanian investment firms are not significantly subject to 
institutional investors’ control or influence. Under such circumstances, we need to find alternatives to improve 
corporate governance practices within these entities. Although the discussion is focussed on how to best 
protect shareholders from fraudulent behaviour on the board of directors (Anand, 2008), we see the problem 
of client protection more relevant.  
Firstly, we need to assess the current level of compliance with relevant requirements, in order to set out 
goals for improvement. One powerful instrument that we suggest for a quantitative assessment regards a 
score-based method, respectively a Score Function. The Score Function is designed to allow a quantitative 
assessment of the level of compliance with the relevant principles, best practices and corporate governance 
rules applicable to investment firms, as synthesized in the Code of Corporate Governance for Investment 
Firms. The Score Function allowed the transformation of declarative and qualitative data, in numerical, 
quantitative data (Spatacean and Ghiorghita, 2012). In the construction process of the Score Function, we 
performed the following steps: 
(a) Establishing the relative importance associated with each significant area of corporate governance. 
Defining significant areas of corporate governance allowed us to prioritize them by setting relative importance 
percentages, based on the assumption that areas with greater importance should gain more of our focus in 
preparing the questions and reviewing the responses. The significant areas of corporate governance, along 
with their relative importance are described in Table 1.  
The significant areas of corporate governance were defined in close relation with OECD Corporate 
Governance Principles, as referred to in the “Comply or Explain” Statement currently required to all security 
issuers listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange (BSE) regulated market. Consequently, the questions 
addressed to those in charge with governance for investment firms, related to: 
• Ensuring a General Framework for Effective Corporate Governance (internal rules and procedures; 
corporate governance structures – e.g. special committees, management, control and internal audit, risk 
assessment; business administration models, etc.). 
• Rights of Shareholders and Equitable Treatment (protection of shareholders’ fundamental rights; equitable 
and fair treatment; protection of minority shareholders' rights, particularly against related party transactions). 
• Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance (institutional investors’ interests in strengthening corporate 
governance processes; cooperation between shareholders, within the limits of market abuse generated by 
concerted actions; communication with financial analysts and the community of  investment advisors; 
corporate social and environmental responsibility). 
• Disclosure and Transparency (effective communication with shareholders; corporate information between 
confidentiality and disclosure obligations; disclosure of the remuneration policy for the Board members; 
detailed explanations for the lack of compliance with corporate governance principles). 
• Responsibilities of the Governance Board (clear demarcation of functions and responsibilities; efficient 
and effective recruitment policies; periodic external evaluation; balance between executive and non-executive 
or independent members, to avoid conflicts of interest; financial and non-financial reporting process, internal 
control and risk management; IT governance).        
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                      Table 1 Relative importance associated to significant areas of corporate governance  






CG Internal Rules and Procedures  11 26.19 
CG Disclosures and Presentations 8 19.05 
Advisory Committees and Commissions   8 19.05 
Board of Directors’ Responsibilities 4 9.52 
IT Governance 3 7.15 
Financial Reporting Process 2 4.76 
Shareholders’ Rights and Approvals 2 4.76 
Investors’ and Community Communication Process 2 4.76 
Control balance 1 2.38 
Environmental and Social Responsibility 1 2.38 
TOTAL 42 100.00 
               (Source: Danescu and Spatacean, 2011)  
 
(b) Determining the individual scores (pi) for each of the quality characteristics indicating a degree of 
compliance. The individual scores may refer to: “zero score” – noncompliance; “one point” – satisfactory 
compliance; “two points” – high compliance; “three points” – total compliance. The scores will be assigned 
based on the following scenarios: 
•  The “zero score” – the investment firm either indicates no answer, or has not published any relevant 
document showing compliance with a particular principle or rule of governance, and the overall information is 
incomplete in a significant manner. 
• The “one point” score – the investment firm complies with the principle / rule of corporate governance at 
a satisfactory level but the answers provided in the Compliance Assessment Questionnaire may conflict with 
other financial or non-financial information published or provided within specific reports to the supervisory 
authority or market institutions;  
• The “two point” score – the investment firm complies with the principle / rule of corporate governance as 
regards a level of over 50% and the answers provided in the Compliance Assessment Questionnaire are 
consistent with other financial or non-financial information published or provided within specific reports to 
the supervisory authority or market institutions;  
• The “three point” score – the investment firm complies in all material respects (in percentage of over 
95%) with the principle / rule of corporate governance in question. 
(c) Establishing the total score (Pt) for each significant area of corporate governance. Each significant 
area of corporate governance is valued through total sub-score, obtained on the basis of each individual score 







                                                                                                                                                  (1) 
 
where, 
Pt – represents the total score determined for the significant area "t" of corporate governance; 
pi – represents the individual score for each of the quality characteristics evaluated for the questions relating  
       to the significant area "t" of corporate governance; 
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n – represents the number of questions related to the significant area "t" of corporate governance;  
t – represents the variable associated to one significant area of corporate governance; t = [1, N] and N = 10 
significant areas of corporate governance. 
(d) Calculating of the score function for assessing the compliance level of an investment firm with the 
principles, rules and best practices of corporate governance. The final score is determined as an average 
function based on the total score determined for the significant area "t" of corporate governance and the 
relative importance associated with each significant area of corporate governance. The score function is 
determined for each investment firm subject to our research and helps establishing a hierarchy in obtaining 
relevant conclusions regarding the compliance level with relevant corporate governance principles and rules, 
according to certain relevant criteria (geographic distribution, market share, ownership of capital or nature of 
industry for qualified shareholdings). The calculation formula used therefore is presented below:       







*                                                                                                                                           (2) 
where, 
Fx – represents the total score for the investment firm "x"; x = [1, M], and M = 38 investment firms selected as 
the population of entities subject of our research. 
Pt – represents the total score determined for the significant area "t" of corporate governance; 
qt – represents the relative importance (weight) assigned to each significant area "t" of corporate governance, 
as described in Table 1. 
2. Research Methodology and Results 
For the purpose of this paper, we focused our research activities on testing the Romanian investment firms’ 
compliance level with OECD Principles and EU Corporate Governance best practices. The compliance level 
was assessed after completing the following research methodology: (i) review the responses obtained as feed-
back for the Compliance Assessment Questionnaire; (ii) examine the Compliance Statement, provided one 
exists and is made available on the official website; (iii) analyze public information disclosed on the official 
websites as referred to corporate governance rules and principles. The process of preparing a model of 
Compliance Assessment Questionnaire regarding the relevant Corporate Governance Principles applicable to 
Romanian Investment Firms, was documented on the fundamental OECD corporate governance principles, on 
the best practices recommended for European Investment Firms, as well as on good governance principles 
recommended to be implemented by Romanian listed entities. Our primary objective was to integrate and 
harmonize these rules and principles in Code of Corporate Governance for Investment Firms, in relation to 
their specific operations and regulatory framework.  
The construction of the database containing all the investment firms authorized to provide investment 
services in Romania was performed based on the following research activities:  
(a) Investigate the relevant parameters of activity for investment firms. The following relevant results 
were obtained after examining the official websites of BSE (www.bvb.ro) and the investment firms subject to 
our research: 
• A total number of 40 investment firms have performed investment services and activities on the Romanian 
capital market, over the reporting period ended in August 2014. The distribution of investment firms in 
relation to the total value traded in 2014 and the market share held over the same period is described in Table 
2. Considering the latter criterion, we concluded that the distribution is profoundly asymmetrical, based on the 
following evidence: (i) a group of two investment firms held a consolidated market share of 47.31%, 
consisting in individual holdings of 26.72%, respectively 20.59%; (ii) a group of four investment firms held a 
consolidated market share of 31.65%, with individual holdings between 5.11% - 9.73%; and (iii) a group of 
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34 investment firms held a consolidated market share of 17.96%, with individual holdings between 0.00% - 
2.56%. 
                    Table 2. Trading Activity and Market Shares held by Investment Firms in 2014  
Traded Value 
(million Lei) 
Market Share Interval  
(%) 
Number of investment firms 
4.000 – 5.500 20 – 27 2 
1.000 – 2.000  5 – 10  4 
200 – 1.000  1 – 3  6 
0– 200  0 – 1  28 
Total Number of Investment Firms 40  
             (Source: Author’s projection)  
 
• For a number of three investment firms, FSA withdrew the operating licenses in the course of 2014; 
therefore these firms have not been active during August 2014. Also, for an investment firm we noticed the 
intention to withdraw from the Romanian capital market starting with October 2014 and for another 
investment firm we could not identify the official website, although NSC Regulation 32/2006 requires such an 
obligation. For these reasons, we decided to remove these five investment firms in the sample that is the 
subject of our research approaches. The consolidated market share of the group for 2014 was 2.88%, 
insignificant to influence research results. Consequently, the sample subjected to our fundamental research 
consists of 38 investment firms currently operating on the Romanian capital market, with a consolidated 
market share of 96.74%. 
• The distribution of investment firms regarding the nature of propriety upon qualified investments held in 
capital is described in Table 3. We concluded that the highest number of investment firms in the sample 
observed (21 entities) held a capital majority from resident shareholders (individuals and legal entities). 
However, the consolidated market share in this category of investment firms reached only 34.65%. 
Investment firms with foreign majority capital were in number of 15 and held a consolidated market share of 
61.04%, almost double compared to the consolidated market share held by investment firms owned primarily 
domestic. Joint venture investment firms had an insignificant market share (1.05%), due to the small number 
(only two entities).   
                     Table 3. Investment Firm Distribution by the capital nature 
Capital Nature 
(significant holdings) 
Market Share Interval  
(%) 
Number of investment firms 
Foreign capital 20 – 27 15 
Domestic capital  5 – 10  21 
Joint capital  1 – 3  2 
Total Number of Investment Firms 38 
             (Source: Author’s projection)  
 
• Depending on the sector of the qualified holders, we concluded that the largest share in the market 
(67.50%) was held by investment firms eligible for funding from institutional investors, with significant 
shareholders, either entities in the banking sector (47.56%) or entities in the asset management industry 
(19.94%). However, the number of investment firms in this category is less than half of the total investment 
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firms investigated (only 15 entities). A total of 23 investment firms formed 29.24% of the market and are held 
by shareholders (individuals or companies) that do not operate in the financial or banking sector. The 
distribution is therefore reflected in Table 4. We consider that the analysis of investment firms in terms of the 
three relevant criteria (market share, ownership of capital and the nature of industry for qualified investors) 
facilitates efficient selection of the sample. Moreover, we estimate that the three criteria that supported the 
sample selection involve a significant influence in ensuring a high degree of conformity with relevant 
principles of corporate governance. 
                    Table 4. Investment Firm Distribution by the operating sector of qualified investors  
Industry 
(significant holdings) 
Market Share   
(%) 
Number of investment firms 
Banking 47.56 9 
Asset management  19.94  6 
Non-financial 29.24 23 
Total Number of Investment Firms 38 
             (Source: Author’s projection)  
 
(b) Examine of the status of authorized intermediary for the investment firms selected in the sample. We 
questioned the official website of FSA Register of financial instruments and investments, Section 1 INTM - 
Intermediaries who provide investment services in Romania and we concluded that all investment firms 
included in the sample have currently a valid authorization to operate on the Romanian capital market 
intermediary.  
(c) Identify contact details for investment firms in the sample. We questioned the official websites of 
each investment firm in the sample, to collect contact details for submission the Compliance Assessment 
Questionnaire. 
Further, we present the results obtained for SSIF Broker, the only authorized intermediary listed on the 
Bucharest Stock Exchange, based on the review of the Compliance Statement available on the intermediary’s 
official website. Before the description of Score Function value, we consider relevant to describe some 
relevant evidence of non-compliance with requirements related to some significant Corporate Governance 
area. These non-compliance examples determined a lower score for the entity subject of our research and they 
mainly referred to: not preparing a CG Rule or Memorandum; not adopting adequate GSM procedures; not 
performing independent periodic assessment of the Board members; not ensuring adequate protection of 
confidential information; not having a distinctive section on the website regarding Corporate Governance; not 
publishing an updated Memorandum (Article of Association); not developing a Remuneration Policy, subject 
to GSM approval; not establishing a Nomination Committee; not having an English version of the website or 
not organizing meetings with financial analysts, brokers and investment advisors. 
The value of the Score Function is determined by Formula (3), presented below: 
 
Fx = 11 * 26.19/100 + 17 * 19.05/100 + 18 * 19.05/100 + 11 * 9.52/100 + 4 * 7.15/100 +                              (3) 
  3 * 4.76/100 + 3 * 4.76/100 + 3 * 4.76/100 + 3 * 2.38/100 + 3 * 2.38/100 = 11.45 (points)   
 
The results that support the Score Function calculation are presented in Table 5. We noticed the poorest 
compliance in the area of CG Internal Rules and Procedures, where the number of questions was the highest. 
Strong and very strong compliance was observed for the areas CG Disclosures and Presentations (70.83%), 
Advisory Committees and Commissions (75.00%) and Board of Directors’ Responsibilities (91.66%). Control 
balance in the decisional process within the Board of Directors and Environmental – Social Responsibilities 
477 Ioan-Ovidiu Spătăcean /  Procedia Economics and Finance  32 ( 2015 )  471 – 478 
are examples of CG area with full compliance, yet the number of questions asked was insignificant. The 
remaining areas (IT Governance, Financial Reporting Process, Shareholders’ Rights and Approvals and 
Investors’ and Community Communication Process) have a medium compliance level, even though the 
number of questions may not reflect the most relevant aspects of the phenomena investigated.  
Based on these calculations, we obtained a value of 11.45 points for the Score Function, which led us to 
the conclusion that SSIF Broker has an overall satisfactory level of compliance, with an effective rate of 
55.67%. The effective rate was obtained by dividing the obtained Score Function value to the maximum value 
(20.57 points).  
Table 5. Score Function Value calculation for SSIF Broker  















CG Internal Rules and Procedures  11 26.19 33 11 33.33 
CG Disclosures and Presentations 8 19.05 24 17 70.83 
Advisory Committees and Commissions   8 19.05 24 18 75.00 
Board of Directors’ Responsibilities 4 9.52 12 11 91.66 
IT Governance 3 7.15 9 4 44.44 
Financial Reporting Process 2 4.76 6 3 50.00 
Shareholders’ Rights and Approvals 2 4.76 6 3 50.00 
Investors’ and Community Communication Process 2 4.76 6 3 50.00 
Control balance 1 2.38 3 3 100.00 
Environmental and Social Responsibility 1 2.38 3 3 100.00 
TOTAL 42 100.00 126 76 n/a 
 (Source: Author’s projection)   
3. Conclusions 
As a result of our research, we have obtained a confirmation to support one relevant conclusion stated in 
the Study on Monitoring and Enforcement of Practices in Corporate Governance in the Member States, 
according to which: “60% of cases where listed companies chose not to apply recommendations, they did not 
provide sufficient explanations”. Such a conclusion would best address to the contrary meaning of the 
assertion formulated by Lutgart, 2002: “corporate governance is more than compliance with guidelines and 
rules of control and supervision”. Nevertheless, we conclude that there is an overall satisfactory compliance 
with OECD Principles and European best practices, in all relevant aspects. Therefore we are optimistic that 
stakeholders’ interests in a Romanian sound financial intermediation system are satisfied, offering credibility 
and protection against abusive market practices. As a limitation of our research, we must mention a poor feed-
back related to our Compliance Assessment Questionnaire. Therefore, for future work, we plan another 
session of collecting evidence to support investment firms’ compliance with relevant corporate governance 
principles.    
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